

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
SUBJECT: Flap with Muskie Over PD-59

I do not know if the flap will continue and why Muskie has chosen to carry it on in the media. For your information, here is the background:

1. I have enclosed the text of the memorandum which was sent to you with PD-59. One of the alternatives was a NSC meeting which Muskie would have attended.
2. Brown was instructed by you to brief Muskie, and on August 5 I reminded him to do so. He did, but the following day before Brown could show the actual directive to Muskie, both the New York Times and the Washington Post broke the story that precipitated Muskie's ire.
3. The development of PD-59 was ordered by you in PD-18 in August 1977. During the next two years, at least three formal SCC meetings were held, and Vance was involved in two and Christopher in one. In addition, at least two internal DOD studies on the subject were initiated in 1977 and circulated to State and the NSC. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense's annual reports to Congress for FY '79, '80 and '81 contained explicit descriptions of the targeting flexibility -- the countervailing strategy -- embodied in PD-59. These documents were previewed by State. In addition, Brown made a statement to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group on June 4, 1980, on the countervailing doctrine. Muskie's State Department subordinates should have briefed him on its contents prior to the NATO ministerial in Ankara. This was apparently not done.
4. The SCCs in the spring of 1979 took note of Defense's progress in implementing the results of the targeting study. This past winter, I suggested in a memo to Harold Brown that we complete the process initiated by PD-18 in a directive which codified what had been done within Defense and the general direction for future development which his countervailing strategy implies. He agreed

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Review on August 15, 2000  
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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Per  
NSC Ltr 4/7/2000  
By EJE LC Date 10/10/2000

and suggested that he and I work out a final product prior to any additional interagency review. To my initial draft of a PD, he added considerable detail on the present SIOP, giving it a far more sensitive substance than it originally had.

5. State officials did not participate in the translation of the doctrine into specific SIOP instructions and for very good reasons. These adjustments are extraordinarily sensitive. The tradition of keeping military contingency planning away from our diplomatists except in its general outline is an old and valid one.

The whole thing seems to me more a matter of personal sensitivity than substance, even though Brown was somewhat slow in briefing Muskie after you initiated that approach; however, both of them were on the move and it was not easy for them to get together. Nevertheless, the central point remains valid: the SIOP should not be reviewed or discussed by those not authorized or required to deal with it; only the broad doctrine should be -- and Harold's statements of broad doctrine are -- on the public record. (S)